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Abstract 
The supervision of P2P lending platforms has always been a hot topic. However, if the 
government regulates the platform too strictly, it would restrain the subjective initiative of 
Internet financial innovation, and if the government overstimulates the platform, it might lead 
to systemic financial risks. From the perspective of government double objective optimization, 
this article sets a specific scene and analyzes the policy choice of supervision and incentive of 
P2P platform through game theory modeling and numerical simulation. Two schemes are 
offered, respectively, “First regulate and then motivate” and “First motivate and then 
regulate”. The results show that the government should first motivate and then regulate the 
P2P lending platforms, so as to achieve the government's dual objective optimization and utility 
maximization. Moreover, the investment of supervision and incentive should be adjusted 
continuously with the development of the industry. 
Keywords: P2P lending, illegal innovation, compliance innovation, supervision, incentive 
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Introduction 
P2P (Peer-to-Peer) lending is an online private lending platform based on Internet technology. On the 
platform, one side is the lender who wants to invest idle funds, the other side is the borrowers with the 
need for capital, while the P2P lending platform mainly acts as information intermediary and 
matchmaking transaction. The P2P online lending platform is able to fully combine the advantages of 
technology and make the information flow more fully and resource integration more efficient, which is 
an important manifestation of internet financial innovation. 
However, there are also many problems and risks in this industry. First of all, the P2P lending is an 
emerging internet financial industry, which exists in an uncertain internet environment, and faces the 
risks of externality, competition and market. Secondly, most P2P lending platforms lack mature 
operation and corresponding supervision, which are easy to fall into the “confusion” and “bottleneck” 
of development. According to the annual report of 2016 Institute of China Zero-One P2P lending, as of 
the end of 2016, the number of problematic platforms in Chinese P2P lending industry reached 3,231, 
accounting for 67% of the industry’s total online platform. Among them, there were 1,106 problematic 
platforms in 2016 and 433 websites with no reason to close, accounting for 39.2%, in addition, there are 
181 and 79 platforms that have lost track and have difficulty withdrawing cash, accounting for 16.4% 
and 7.1% respectively. Numerous risk events have increasingly highlighted the importance of 
government management.  
In recent years, P2P lending has been increasingly concerned by the state and the government, and the 
corresponding regulatory mechanism is gradually improving. In 2016, P2P entered the “First year of 
regulation”, and the regulatory policy was dense”. On April 14th, the State Council organized 14 
ministries and commissions to convene the meeting and issued “The Implementation Plan of P2P 
Lending Risk and Regulation Work”. On August 24, the CBRC (China Banking Regulatory 
Commission), the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security and 
the State Internet Information Office jointly issued “The Interim Measures for the Management of 
Business Activities of Internet Lending Intermediaries”. 
Compliance internet finance innovation is able to improve the operational efficiency of the financial 
markets, while illegal innovation will reduce the stability of the financial system. Therefore, it is an 
especially important issue for the government to regulate the illegal innovation of P2P lending platforms 
and encourage compliance innovation of P2P lending platform. If the government regulates P2P 
platform too strictly, it would curb the effective space of financial innovation. If the government 
excessively motivates the platform, it may destroy the order of financial market and trigger systemic 
financial risk. Therefore, only when the government correctly handles the balance between supervision 
and incentive of P2P lending platform, can we guarantee the stable and healthy development of the P2P 
lending industry better. 
From the viewpoints that the government not only would like to increase the economic benefits of P2P 
lending development but also would like to enhance the security of the industry, this paper sets up a 
specific scenario, establishes the game theory model, and then provides two schemes, namely: “ First 
regulate and then motivate” and “First motivate and then regulate”. Through game theory and numerical 
simulation, this paper analyzes the timing strategy of monitoring or motivating the P2P lending platform 
and ultimately finds the government’s optimal bi-objective strategy which could provide a theoretical 
basis for the sustainable development of P2P online lending. 
Literature Review 
In China, P2P online lending industry is booming, the number of platforms is growing rapidly, however, 
due to poor self-discipline and lack of strict supervision, some P2P lending platforms go bankrupt, which 
seriously damage the interests of lenders and jeopardized the healthy development of the industry. In 
recent years, the supervision of the illegal operation of P2P lending platforms has attracted the attention 
of many scholars. Feng et al. (2013) argue that under the distorted financing environment, many risks 
are hidden behind the P2P lending platform. Therefore, they analyze the alienation of P2P lending 
platforms in China and propose regulatory measures on this basis. Tan (2014) argues that in the process 
of building industry self-regulation mechanism, the government needs to supervise the P2P platform 
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and set up relevant incentive mechanisms to ensure the sustainable development of the market. Zhong 
(2017) summarizes the operation mode, risk, loan mode and development status of P2P network loan 
platform in detail. Based on the theory of behavioral finance, Gong (2014) further explains the current 
risks of P2P lending industry and the necessity of government supervision. Liu (2015) points out that 
the legal deficiencies of private lending and imperfect institutional supervision are the main problems 
in P2P online lending in China. Shuai (2014) states that too strict regulatory and access systems are not 
conducive to the development of P2P industry. The government need to fully consider regulatory 
tolerance.  
Internet financial innovation is able to increase the excess profits of financial institutions, but at the same 
time, illegal innovation would induce new systemic financial risks and undermine the stability of the 
financial system. Therefore, the supervision of government is to make up for the market defects and 
achieve fairness and efficiency. There is a mutual promotion or antagonistic relationship between 
financial innovation and financial regulation. Many scholars use game theory to analyze the relationship 
between the two. Cao et al. (2014) construct a dynamic game model of financial innovation and 
regulation. They discuss how financial innovation and regulation can strike a balance in the dynamic 
game. Zhang et al. (2017) measure the over-innovation risks of internet finance companies by unrealistic 
disclosure of risk probabilities, and then establish a random supervisory game model of over-innovation 
risks in the internet finance. Liu et al. (2017) use evolutionary game theory to analyze the game evolution 
process of internet financial platform behavior and its regulatory strategy, and also compare the 
equilibrium between static and dynamic punishment mechanism. Based on the evolutionary game theory, 
Peng (2016) integrates the incentive mechanism of regulatory agencies for compliance innovation into 
the analysis framework. And then he studies the strategic choice between financial innovation and 
incentive regulation in mutual game. Xie et al. (2014) suggest that the government should regulate P2P 
lending in three aspects: improving the access threshold, strengthening operation and management, and 
improving information supervision. From the perspective of group game and adaptation, Du (2015) 
establishes an innovation path and a supervised evolutionary game model of Internet finance 
respectively by using evolutionary game theory, which provides a theoretical basis for the effective 
formation of innovation strategy and supervision strategy. 
Through the combing of related literatures, it can be seen that that previous research on P2P lending 
regulation, financial innovation or regulation game mainly focus on theoretical discussion, regulatory 
game and policy suggestion, although some scholars have proposed the inclusion of incentives in 
financial regulation, few scholars have studied the timing issues of the two strategies of regulatory 
constraints and incentive mechanisms. In summary, this paper attempts to overcome the deficiencies of 
existing research, according to the current situation of China’s P2P network lending, set a specific 
scenario, establish a game model between the government and the P2P platform. We will focus on 
analysis and discussion whether the government should adopt the strategy of “First regulate and then 
motivate” or “First motivate and then regulate”, and how to weigh the government’s dual-goal plan in 
the final stages of parallelism of incentives and regulatory. 
Establishment of game model 
Model description and variable setting 
The government has two goals. The first one is to promote the financial innovation in P2P lending 
industry and generate more innovative economic benefits, so that the government can also obtain some 
benefits such as tax revenue and reputation. The second one is to maintain the security and stability of 
the P2P network credit industry and restrain the phenomenon of illegal operation of the platform. 
Therefore, on the one hand, the government regulates and controls the non-compliance platform. On the 
other hand, it also needs to implement the incentive mechanism for the professional platform. 
According to the risk and professional level, P2P lending platforms are classified into three types: risk 
type, transition type and professional type. Among them, risk type platforms have low investment 
threshold, high yield and strong liquidity, however the probability of its illegal risks is high. Transitional 
platforms have lower risk and return than risk platforms, but operate more professionally than risk 
platforms. Professional platforms have the strongest financial strength, safety and professionalism, and 
the lowest average rate of return. When the government implements the incentive mechanism, some 
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transitional platforms can be transformed into professional platforms. When the government implements 
regulatory measures, some of the risky platforms will leave the P2P industry. The two schemes are 
proposed, respectively, “First regulate and then motivate” and “First motivate and then regulate”. 
The government effective evaluation coefficient in the period 𝑗 of the project 𝑖 is 𝐺𝑖𝑗 , (𝑖 = 1,2，𝑗 =
1,2,3,4), the probability that the government regulates and found the violation is 𝑃, 𝑃 ∈ (0,1), the illegal 
operation coefficient of P2P lending platform is 𝜆, 𝜆 ∈ (1,5), the incentive coefficient for the platform 
is 𝛽, 𝛽 ∈ (0,1), the proportion of economic benefits that the government obtains from the overall 
revenue of the P2P industry is 𝑏, 𝑏 ∈ (0,1), the penalty coefficient of the platform is 𝜃  when the 
platform violations are discovered by the government, if the platform violations are not discovered by 
the government, the loss to the government will be 𝑔，besides 𝑘1，𝑘2，𝑘3 represent respectively the 
initial proportion of the number of risky platforms, transitional platforms and professional platforms 
and 𝑘1 + 𝑘2 + 𝑘2 = 1, 𝑘4 represents the proportion of transitional platform into a professional platform, 
when the government implements the incentive mechanism for the platform, 𝑄 indicates the initial total 
number of P2P platforms in the industry，𝑄1 indicates the total number of P2P platforms when the 
“First regulate and then motivate” strategy is adopted，𝑄2 indicates the total number of P2P platforms 
when the “First motivate then regulate” strategy is adopted, the benchmark income of P2P platform is 
(𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖 , (𝑖 = 1,2,3), under the dual objective scenario, the weight coefficient that the government 
chooses economic benefits is 𝛼1，the weight coefficient that government chooses industry safety is 
α2 and 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 = 1，𝐻0 represents the total economic benefit of P2P lending industry at present, 𝐻𝑖𝑗 
represents the actual total economic benefit that the government obtained from P2P net loan industry in 
the period 𝑗 of the project 𝑖. 
 Project A: “First regulate and then motivate” 
 The first phase: goal planning model 
In the first stage, three types of P2P platforms exist in the internet financial market in a certain proportion. 
The government has not established effective regulatory or incentive mechanism for the operation of 
P2P lending platforms. However, due to the existence of risky and transitional platforms, the P2P 
industry may suffer losses caused by the illegal operation of some platforms. In this period, the utility 
evaluation coefficient of the government is 𝐺11, which represents the ratio of dividing the government’s 
actual profit by the government’s profit when there is no risk of violation.  
𝐻0 = ∑ 𝜆
2𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1 (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖 + ∑ 𝜆(𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖
𝑘2𝑄
𝑖=1 + ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1                                                     (1) 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺11 =
𝑏𝐻0−𝑔
𝑏𝐻0
                                                                                                                        (2) 
𝐻11 = 𝑏𝐻0 − 𝑔                                                                                                                           (3) 
To ensure that the actual government benefits at this stage are positive, it is necessary to satisfy the 
condition 𝑔 < 𝑏𝐻0. 
 The second stage: “regulation” goal planning model 
In order to avoid the loss caused by the violation of P2P lending platforms to the society and the 
government itself, the government started to establish and improve the supervision mechanism of P2P 
lending platform management. Suppose the probability that the government discovers the illegal 
operation of P2P lending platform is 𝑃 , and when the government regulates the platform and can 
discover violation in time, it will stop the platform business and give the platform punishment, the 
corresponding penalty coefficient is 𝜃. At this time the government received a fine 𝜃 ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1 (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖, 
at the same time lost some of the profits obtained from the risky platform, and also avoided the loss of 
𝑔 to the government itself when the platform was violated. In this process, the government increases the 
possibility of discovering platform violations with the probability of 𝑃, so the cost of supervision and 
management can be considered as exponential growth (Zhao et al., 2017) and we set it as 𝑒2𝑝. The utility 
of the government at this stage is shown in equation (4). 
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𝐺12 =
𝐻11−𝑃[(𝑏−𝜃) ∑ 𝜆
2𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1
(𝑅−𝐶)𝑖−𝑔]−𝑒
2𝑃
𝐻11
                                                                                        (4) 
𝐻12 = 𝐻11 − 𝑃[(𝑏 − 𝜃) ∑ 𝜆
2𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1 (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖 − 𝑔] − 𝑒
2𝑝                                                                (5) 
Since at this stage we focus on the changes in the impact of government regulatory strategies on its 
utility, so we set the government regulatory factor 𝑃  as an independent variable, and set the 
government's utility coefficient 𝐺12  as a dependent variable, then find the first derivative of 𝑃  in 
equation (4). 
𝜕𝐺12
𝜕𝑃
= −
[(𝑏−𝜃) ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1
(𝑅−𝐶)𝑖−𝑔]+2𝑒
2𝑃
𝐻11
                                                                                           (6) 
When 
𝜕𝐺12
𝜕𝑃
> 0, P <
1
2
ln (
𝑔−(𝑏−𝜃) ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1
(𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
2
); when 
𝜕𝐺12
𝜕𝑃
< 0时，P >
1
2
ln (
𝑔−(𝑏−𝜃) ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1
(𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
2
), in 
order to make the optimal utility of the government at this stage exist, so we have, 0 <
 
1
2
ln (
𝑔−(𝑏−𝜃) ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1
(𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
2
) < 1  and 𝑔 − (𝑏 − 𝜃) ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1 (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖 > 0 ， finally, each parameter 
should meet the conditions: 2 < 𝑔 − (𝑏 − 𝜃) ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1 (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖 < 2𝑒
2 , set 𝑃∗ =
1
2
ln (
𝑔−(𝑏−𝜃) ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1
(𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
2
), at this moment, we can see that in the second stage, when P is less than 𝑃∗, 
the government utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺12 increases with the increase of regulatory power P; 
when P is greater than 𝑃∗, the government utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺12 begins to decrease with the 
increase of regulatory power P; when P is equal to 𝑃∗ , there exists an optimal government utility 
evaluation coefficient 𝐺12(𝑃
∗). 
 The third stage: “incentive” goal planning model 
In the third stage, in order to improve the overall security and stability of the P2P lending industry, the 
government started to adopt an incentive mechanism for the professional P2P platform to promote the 
development of the professional platform and at the same time attract some transitional P2P platforms 
to become professional P2P platforms gradually. The incentive mechanism of the government on the 
professional platform may be embodied in such supportive policies as market priority access, financial 
support and tax incentives. When implementing the incentive mechanism, the government needed to 
pay the cost of 𝐿 = ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖𝛽
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1 + 𝑀 , 𝑀  is the additional cost to the government. As  𝑘4𝑄 
transitional platforms were attracted by the incentive mechanism and thus gradually transformed into 
professional P2P platforms, the government’s revenue from the P2P lending industry was reduced by 
(𝜆 − 1)(1 + 𝛽2) ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖
𝑘4𝑄
𝑖=1 . In this case, the proportion of professional platforms in P2P lending 
industry rose to (𝑘3 + 𝑘4), the proportion of risky platforms decreased to (1 − 𝑃)𝑘1, so the security 
utility that government obtained from professional platform of industry is 
(1+𝛽2)(𝑘3+𝑘4)
(1−𝑃)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3
 , and (1 + 𝛽2) 
is the incentive mechanism of the coefficient that this paper set up . In addition, due to the departure of 
the risky platform, the economic losses suffered by the government are: X = |(𝑏 − 𝜃) ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1 (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖|. 
Through incentive mechanism, such as tax reduction and other preferential policies, the long-term 
economic benefits could be brought to the government are: D =
𝐿
𝑋
𝑄 . The importance that the 
government attaches to the economic benefits and safety of the industry, respectively, is α1 and α2. 
𝐺13 = α1 {
𝐻12−∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖𝛽
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1 −𝑀−(𝜆−1)(1+𝛽
2) ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘4𝑄
𝑖=1 +𝐷
𝐻12
} +
α2(1+𝛽
2)(𝑘3+𝑘4)
(1−𝑃)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3
                            (7) 
𝐻13 = 𝐻12 − ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖𝛽
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1 − 𝑀 − (𝜆 − 1)(1 + 𝛽
2) ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖
𝑘4𝑄
𝑖=1 + 𝐷                              (8) 
This stage mainly analyzes the impact of incentive mechanism on government utility, so we set the 
government’s P2P platform incentive coefficient 𝛽 as an independent variable, the government in this 
stage the utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺13 as dependent variable. In equation (7), find the first derivative 
and the second derivative for 𝛽 respectively. 
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𝜕𝐺13
𝜕𝛽
= α1 {
− ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1 −2𝛽(𝜆−1) ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘4𝑄
𝑖=1 +
𝑄
𝑋
∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1
𝐻2
} +
2𝛽α2(𝑘3+𝑘4)
(1−𝑃)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3
                               (9) 
𝜕2𝐺13
𝜕𝛽2
=
−2α1(𝜆−1) ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘4𝑄
𝑖=1
𝐻2
+
2α2(𝑘3+𝑘4)
(1−𝑃)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3
                                                                            (10) 
At this stage, if 𝐺13  has the optimal solution, the condition 
𝜕2𝐺3
𝜕𝛽2
< 0  must be satisfied, let 𝛽∗ =
α1
𝐻2
[− ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1 +
𝑄
𝑋
∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1 ]
2(𝜆−1) ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘4𝑄
𝑖=1
−
2α2(𝑘3+𝑘4)
(1−𝑃)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3
, therefore, it is easy to figure out that in the third stage, when 𝛽 < 𝛽∗, the 
government utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺13 increases with the incentive coefficient increasing. When 
𝛽 < 𝛽∗ , the government utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺13  decreases with the incentive coefficient 
increasing; if and only if 𝛽 = 𝛽∗, there is an optimal government utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺13(𝛽
∗). 
 The fourth stage: Incentives and Regulatory Parallelism 
After the government implemented the strategy of “First regulate and then motivate”, the incentive 
mechanism and supervisory measures coexisted in P2P industry. After the incentive mechanism, the 
number of professional platforms in the industry rose to (𝑘3 + 𝑘4)𝑄. After the regulatory measures, the 
number of risky platforms reduced to 𝑘1(1 − 𝑃
∗)𝑄. The total number of platforms changed from 𝑄 to 
𝑄1 = 𝑘1(1 − 𝑃
∗)𝑄 + (𝑘2 + 𝑘3)𝑄. At this stage, the cost to be paid by the government to implement the 
incentive mechanism is: 𝐿 = ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖𝛽
(𝑘3+𝑘4)𝑄
𝑖=1 + 𝑀. In addition, incentive mechanism also attracted 
𝑘5𝑄  transition platforms to transform into professional platforms, at this moment, the government 
reduced the revenue obtained from P2P lending industry by (𝜆 − 1)(1 +  𝛽2) ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖
𝑘5𝑄
𝑖=1 . As part of 
the risky platforms to leave, the government’s economic losses are: X = |(𝑏 − 𝜃) ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1(1−𝑃
∗)𝑄
𝑖=1 (𝑅 −
𝐶)𝑖| , the long-term economic benefits brought by the government through incentive mechanism 
are:  𝐷1 =
𝐿
𝑋
𝑄1 ， the utility obtained from the industry safety of the professional platform is 
α2(1+𝛽
2)(1+𝛽∗
2
)(𝑘3+𝑘4)
(1−𝑃)(1−𝑃∗)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3
, 𝛽∗  and 𝑃∗  represent the optimal incentive coefficient of the incentive 
mechanism and the optimal supervision of the regulatory measures respectively in project A. 
𝐺14 =
α1
𝐻13
{𝐻13 − 𝑃 [(𝑏 − 𝜃) ∑ 𝜆
2𝑘1(1−𝑃
∗)𝑄
𝑖=1 (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖 − 𝑔] − 𝑒
2𝑃 − ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖𝛽
(𝑘3+𝑘4)𝑄
𝑖=1 − 𝑀 −
(𝜆 − 1)(1 +  𝛽2) ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖
𝑘5𝑄
𝑖=1 + 𝐷1} +
α2(1+𝛽
2)(1+𝛽∗
2
)(𝑘3+𝑘4)
(1−𝑃)(1−𝑃∗)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3
                                                (11) 
In this stage, we will analyze the influence of incentive mechanism and regulatory strategy on 
government utility coefficient at the same time. Therefore, we use the incentive coefficient 𝛽  and 
regulatory power 𝑃  as the independent variables, and the utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺14  of the 
government at this stage as the dependent variable. When 
𝜕2𝐺14
𝜕𝛽2
< 0，then 
𝜕2𝐺14
𝜕𝑃2
𝜕2𝐺14
𝜕𝛽2
− (
𝜕2𝐺14
𝜕𝛽𝜕𝑃
)2 > 0，
at this point, there exists a maximum of function (11), that is, there exists an optimal coefficient of 
government utility evaluation 𝐺14; when 
𝜕2𝐺14
𝜕𝛽2
> 0, then 
𝜕2𝐺14
𝜕𝑃2
𝜕2𝐺14
𝜕𝛽2
− (
𝜕2𝐺14
𝜕𝛽𝜕𝑃
)2 < 0，at this point, there 
is no maximum for function (11); when 
𝜕2𝐺14
𝜕𝛽2
= 0，then it is not possible to determine whether the 
maximum value of function (11) exists, which needs further discussion. 
 Project B: “First motivate and then regulate” 
In this project, first of all, the government inspired the P2P platform to enhance the safety, stability and 
professional level of the entire industry. The first phase of this project is the same as project A, which 
is an objective description of the scenario set out in this paper, so 𝐺21 = 𝐺11，𝐻21 = 𝐻11. 
 The second stage: “incentive” goal planning model 
The specific strategy of this stage is the same as the incentive mechanism of the third stage of project A. 
The only difference is that this stage only considers the impact of the incentive mechanism on economic 
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returns and does not consider the impact of the safety promotion. Set the utility coefficient of evaluation 
is 𝐺32. 
𝐺22 =
𝐻21−∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖𝛽
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1 −𝑀−(𝜆−1)(1+𝛽
2) ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘4𝑄
𝑖=1 +𝐷
𝐻21
                                                         (12) 
𝐻22 = 𝐻21 − ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖𝛽
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1 − 𝑀 − (𝜆 − 1)(1 + 𝛽
2) ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖
𝑘4𝑄
𝑖=1 + 𝐷                     (13) 
This stage mainly analyzes the impact of incentive mechanism on the government’s utility. Therefore, 
the incentive coefficient 𝛽 is the independent variable, and the government utility evaluation coefficient 
𝐺22 at this stage is the dependent variable. Find the first derivative and the second derivative of 𝛽 for 
function (12) respectively. 
𝜕𝐺22
𝜕𝛽
=
− ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖−2𝛽(𝜆−1) ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖+
∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1
𝑋
𝑄
𝑘4𝑄
𝑖=1
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1
𝐻21
                                                             (14) 
𝜕2𝐺22
𝜕𝛽2
=
−2(𝜆−1) ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘4𝑄
𝑖=1
𝐻21
                                                                                                    (15) 
Since 𝜆 ∈ (1,5)，obviously 
𝜕2𝐺32
𝜕𝛽2
< 0，so there is an optimal solution for 𝐺22 in this phase, let 𝛽
∗∗ =
− ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖+
∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1
𝑋
𝑄
𝑘3𝑄
𝑖=1
2(𝜆−1) ∑ (𝑅−𝐶)𝑖
𝑘4𝑄
𝑖=1
, it is easy to conclude that in the third phase, when 𝛽 < 𝛽∗∗, the government 
utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺32 increases with the increase of the incentive coefficient; when 𝛽 > 𝛽
∗∗, 
the government's utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺3 decreases with the increase of the incentive coefficient, 
and if and only if 𝛽 = 𝛽∗∗, there is an optimal government utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺22(𝛽
∗∗). 
 The third stage: “regulation” goal planning model 
In addition to regulatory measures, the government also needs to make dual-objective planning in this 
stage. So, we need to take into account the utility 
α2(1+𝛽
2)(𝑘3+𝑘4)
(1−𝑃)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3
 that government obtained from the 
industry safety brought by incentive and regulatory measures, moreover, the regulatory strategy is 
consistent with the regulation in project A. And the degree of attention paid by the government to the 
innovative economic benefits and industry safety brought by the P2P industry are respectively α1 and 
α2. At this stage, the government's utility coefficient is 𝐺23. 
𝐺23 = α1 {
𝐻22−𝑃[(𝑏−𝜃) ∑ 𝜆
2𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1
(𝑅−𝐶)𝑖−𝑔]−𝑒
2𝑃
𝐻22
} +
α2(1+𝛽
2)(𝑘3+𝑘4)
(1−𝑃)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3
                                         (16) 
𝐻23 = 𝐻22 − 𝑃[(𝑏 − 𝜃) ∑ 𝜆
2𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1 (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖 − 𝑔] − 𝑒
2𝑃                                                       (17) 
Since we mainly analyze the influence mechanism of government regulation on platform on government 
utility in this stage, we use the supervision 𝑃 as the independent variable and the government utility 
evaluation coefficient 𝐺23 as the dependent variable. Find the first derivative and the second derivative 
for 𝑃 for equation (16) respectively. 
𝜕𝐺23
𝜕𝑃
= α1 {
−(𝑏−𝜃) ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1𝑄
𝑖=1
(𝑅−𝐶)𝑖+𝑔−2𝑒
2𝑃
𝐻3
} +
𝑘1
[(1−𝑃)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3]
2                                                (18) 
𝜕2𝐺23
𝜕𝑃2
=
−4α1𝑒
2𝑃
𝐻3
                                                                                                                     (19) 
When 
𝜕2𝐺23
𝜕𝑃2
< 0, 𝐺23 has the optimal solution, let 𝑃
∗∗ be the optimal solution. In the third stage, when 
𝑃 < 𝑃∗∗, the utility coefficient𝐺23 of government increases with the increase of supervision intensity, 
and when 𝑃 > 𝑃∗∗, the government utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺23 decreases with the increase of 
supervision intensity; if and only if 𝑃 = 𝑃∗∗ , there exists the optimal government utility evaluation 
coefficient 𝐺23(𝑃
∗∗). 
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 The fourth stage: Incentives and Regulatory Parallelism 
After the government implemented the strategy of “First motivate and then regulate”, the incentive 
mechanism and supervisory measures coexisted in P2P industry. After the incentive mechanism, the 
number of professional platforms in the industry rose to (𝑘3 + 𝑘4)𝑄. After the regulatory measures, the 
number of risky platforms was reduced to 𝑘1(1 − 𝑃
∗∗)𝑄. The total number of platforms changed from 
𝑄  to 𝑄2 = 𝑘1(1 − 𝑃
∗∗)𝑄 + (𝑘2 + 𝑘3)𝑄 . At this stage, the cost to be paid by the government to 
implement the incentive mechanism is:  𝐿 = ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖𝛽
(𝑘3+𝑘4)𝑄
𝑖=1 + 𝑀 . In addition, incentive 
mechanism also attracted 𝑘5𝑄  transition platforms to transform into professional platforms, at this 
moment, the government reduced the revenue obtained from P2P industry by (𝜆 − 1)(1 +
 𝛽2) ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖
𝑘5𝑄
𝑖=1 . As part of the risky platforms to leave, the government’s economic losses is: X =
|(𝑏 − 𝜃) ∑ 𝜆2
𝑘1(1−𝑃
∗∗)𝑄
𝑖=1 (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖|, the long-term economic benefits brought by the government through 
incentive mechanism are: 𝐷2 =
𝐿
𝑋
𝑄2，the utility obtained from the industry safety of the professional 
platform is 
α2(1+𝛽
2)(1+𝛽∗∗
2
)(𝑘3+𝑘4)
(1−𝑃)(1−𝑃∗∗)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3
, 𝛽∗∗  and 𝑃∗∗  represent the optimal incentive coefficient of the 
incentive mechanism and the optimal supervision of the regulatory measures respectively in project B. 
𝐺24 =
α1
𝐻23
{𝐻23 − 𝑃 [(𝑏 − 𝜃) ∑ 𝜆
2𝑘1(1−𝑃
∗∗)𝑄
𝑖=1 (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖 − 𝑔] − 𝑒
2𝑃 − ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖𝛽
(𝑘3+𝑘4)𝑄
𝑖=1 − 𝑀 −
(𝜆 − 1)(1 +  𝛽2) ∑ (𝑅 − 𝐶)𝑖
𝑘5𝑄
𝑖=1 + 𝐷2} +
α2(1+𝛽
2)(1+𝛽∗∗
2
)(𝑘3+𝑘4)
(1−𝑃)(1−𝑃∗∗)𝑘1+𝑘2+𝑘3
                                   (20) 
At this stage, we will analyze the influence of incentive mechanism and regulatory strategy on 
government utility coefficient at the same time. So we use the incentive coefficient 𝛽 and regulatory 
power 𝑃  as the independent variables and the government utility evaluation coefficient𝐺24  as the 
dependent variable. When 
𝜕2𝐺24
𝜕𝛽2
< 0，then 
𝜕2𝐺24
𝜕𝑃2
𝜕2𝐺24
𝜕𝛽2
− (
𝜕2𝐺24
𝜕𝛽𝜕𝑃
)2 > 0 , in this case, there exists an 
optimal government utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺24  in function (20); when 
𝜕2𝐺24
𝜕𝛽2
> 0 , then 
𝜕2𝐺24
𝜕𝑃2
𝜕2𝐺24
𝜕𝛽2
− (
𝜕2𝐺24
𝜕𝛽𝜕𝑃
)2 < 0, at this point there is no maximum for function (20); when 
𝜕2𝐺24
𝜕𝛽2
= 0，then 
it is not possible to determine whether the maximum value of function (20) exists, which needs further 
discussion. 
 Numerical Simulation Analysis 
The numerical simulation could clearly and intuitively characterize the dynamic changes of each 
variable in the game model by giving reasonable values to different variables in the model. Many 
scholars combine the numerical simulation method with the game model, which not only enhance the 
persuasion of the theory, but also clearly express the idea of the game model. After building a game 
model, Liu et al. (2017) use simulation to simulate the evolution of the entire system. Peng et al. (2016) 
first establish a game model between financial institutions and regulatory agencies, and then use 
numerical simulation analysis methods to visually illustrate the strategic choices of regulators and 
financial institutions. Du (2015) use numerical simulation analysis to depict the trajectory of game 
evolution of internet finance innovation path and innovation regulation. Therefore, this paper decides to 
use numerical simulation method to characterize the impact of different decision-making choices on the 
comprehensive utility of government. 
 Project A: “First regulate and then motivate” 
 Analysis of the first phase simulation results 
At this stage, set the loss 𝑔 caused by the platform violation to the government as the independent 
variable, the government’s utility coefficient 𝐺11 as the dependent variable, all three types of platforms 
can create profits, but some platform violations will bring loss to the industry and government. The total 
number of platforms in the industry is 𝑄 = 4(𝑇𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑). The benchmark revenue of each platform 
is 𝑅 − 𝐶 = 2(𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑/ 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) and the violation coefficient 𝜆 = 3. At the same time, 𝑘𝑖  is 
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divided into three groups as the adjustment variables. The values of the three groups are 𝑘1 = 0.1, 𝑘2 =
0.4, 𝑘3 = 0.5;  𝑘1 = 0.2, 𝑘2 = 0.4, 𝑘3 = 0.4; 𝑘1 = 0.3, 𝑘2 = 0.4, 𝑘3 = 0.3. 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between 
loss and utility 
As can be seen from Figure 1, as the loss 𝑔 caused by non-compliance gradually increases, the utility 
coefficient of government gradually decreases, and the government has the greatest utility when 𝑘1 =
0.3, 𝑘2 = 0.4, 𝑘3 = 0.3 ,which means as the number of risk-based platforms increases, the utility 
coefficient of government increases. Because the risky platform can bring more short-term gains, the 
government needs to weigh the innovation gains brought by the P2P industry and the losses caused by 
the potential risk in the industry. Since the first stage is the description of the objective reality, and the 
government could not take the initiative to control the size of the losses brought by the platform violation 
to itself, so we take the average value of 𝑔, 𝐺11, 𝐻1, 𝑘1, then 𝑔 = 5, 𝐺11 = 0.5405, 𝐻11 = 5.88, 𝑘1 =
0.2. 
 Analysis of the second phase simulation results 
In the second stage, set the government regulation coefficient 𝑃 as the independent variable, the utility 
coefficient 𝐺12 of the government as the dependent variable, and the punishment coefficient 𝜃 as the 
adjusting variable, which are respectively 0.2, 0.4 and 0.6. According to the analysis of the first stage, 
let 𝑔 = 5 , 𝐺11 = 0.5405 , 𝐻1 = 5.88 , 𝑘1 = 0.2 ,  𝑏 = 0.4, 𝑅 − 𝐶 = 2(𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑/ 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) , 𝑄 =
4(𝑇𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑), substitute these values into formula (4), the result is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between 
regulatory and utility 
As can be seen from Figure 2, the curve occupies the highest position with 𝜃 = 0.6 and the curve 
occupies the lowest position with 𝜃 = 0.2. It is easy to figure out that with the increase of the penalty θ, 
the utility coefficient of government begins to increase. Furthermore, under the condition of keeping the 
penalty coefficient unchanged, with the gradual increase of supervision, the utility of the government 
increases first and then decreases. When the penalty coefficient 𝜃 = 0.6, regulatory probability 𝑃∗ =
0.7, the government utility evaluation coefficient reaches the maximum 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺12 = 1.2487, at this time 
the government’s actual return is 𝐻12 = 7.3408. 
 Analysis of the third phase simulation results 
In the third stage, the government started to implement the incentive mechanism for the professional 
platform in order to ensure the security of the P2P lending industry and bring long-term economic 
benefits to the industry and the government, but at the same time, the government has to pay incentive 
costs. Set the incentive coefficient 𝛽 as an independent variable, the government utility coefficient 𝐺13 
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as the dependent variable. In addition, the government weights 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 of dual objective are regarded 
as adjusting variables and divided into three groups. And the values of the three groups are 𝛼1 = 0.2,
𝛼2 = 0.8; 𝛼1 = 0.5, 𝛼2 = 0.5; 𝛼1 = 0.8, 𝛼2 = 0.2. According to the first and second-stage analysis 
and setting, 𝑔 = 5 , 𝐻1 = 5.88 , 𝑏 = 0.4, 𝑘1 = 0.2 , 𝑘3 = 0.4, 𝑘4 = 0.2, 𝑅 − 𝐶 = 2(𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑/
 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ),𝑄 = 4(𝑇𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑) , then we substitute these values into formula (7), simulation results  
are shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between 
incentive and utility 
As can be seen from Figure 3, in the short term, when the incentive coefficient 𝛽 is relatively small, 
more emphasis on the economic benefits of the industry will make the government’s utility coefficient 
higher, but in the long run, as the government’s incentive coefficient 𝛽  gradually increases, the 
government should pay more attention to the stability and professionalism brought by the P2P industry 
in order to maximize its utility. In the long run, the government should try its best to increase the 
incentive, 𝛽∗ = 1 , 𝛼1 = 0.2  for economic efficiency, 𝛼2 = 0.8  for safety, and then the utility of 
government reaches the maximum 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺13 = 1.2182, at this time then the actual return of government 
is 𝐻13 = 3.7416. 
 Analysis of the fourth phase simulation results 
After the government implemented the strategy of “First regulate and then motivate”, the incentive 
mechanism and supervisory measures coexisted in P2P industry. Set the incentive coefficient 𝛽 and 
regulatory power 𝑃 as the independent variables and the government utility evaluation coefficient 𝐺14 
as the dependent variable. In addition, the government weights 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 of dual objective are regarded 
as adjusting variables and divided into three groups. And the values of the three groups are 𝛼1 = 0.2,
𝛼2 = 0.8; 𝛼1 = 0.5, 𝛼2 = 0.5; 𝛼1 = 0.8, 𝛼2 = 0.2. According to the first and second-stage analysis 
and setting, 𝑔 = 5 , 𝐻13 = 3.7416 , 𝑏 = 0.4, 𝑘1 = 0.2 , 𝑘3 = 0.4, 𝑘4 = 0.2, 𝑘5 = 0.2, 𝑅 − 𝐶 =
2(𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑/ 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ) , 𝑄 = 4(𝑇𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑) ,  𝜃 = 0.6，M = 4, 𝛽∗ = 1, 𝑃∗ = 0.7 , then we 
substitute these values into formula (11), simulation results are shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Relationship among incentive 
coefficient, regulatory and the utility 
When the government attaches more importance to the security of P2P industry (𝛼1 = 0.2，𝛼2 = 0.8), 
the maximum value of government utility is 𝐺14 = 4.3991 , and 𝑃
′ = 0.7, 𝛽′ = 1 . When the 
government attaches equal importance to the security and economic benefits of P2P industry （𝛼1 =
0.5，𝛼2 = 0.5）, the maximum value of government utility is 𝐺14 = 6.288, at this time, 𝑃
′ = 0.68，
𝛽′ = 1. When the government attaches more importance to the economic benefits of P2P industry 
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（𝛼1 = 0.8，𝛼2 = 0.2）,the maximum value of government utility is 𝐺14 = 8.1906,and then  𝑃
′ =
0.62,  𝛽′ = 0.978. It can be seen in the P2P industry has experienced the government regulatory 
measures and incentives, the market’s security and stability has been improved significantly, the 
government’s total utility coefficient has also been increased. 
Therefore, during the parallel phase of regulatory restraint and incentive mechanism, the government 
will pay more attention to the economic benefits brought by the P2P industry. The maximum utility 
coefficient is 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺14 = 8.1906, the supervision degree is 𝑃
′ = 0.62 and the incentive coefficient is 
𝛽′ = 0.978. 
 Project B: “First motivate and then regulate” 
The first phase of the simulation results with the first phase of the project A. 
 Analysis of the second phase simulation results 
At this stage, the government first adopts the supportive policy to encourage the professional platform 
of P2P industry, which leads some of the transitional platform 𝑘4𝑄  will be transformed into a 
professional platform. Set the incentive coefficient 𝛽  as an independent variable, the government’s 
utility coefficient 𝐺32 as dependent variable, the additional incentive cost M as a adjusting variable, and 
M values were 2, 4, 6 (𝑇𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑) respectively, and also 𝐻1 = 5.88，𝑘3 = 0.4，𝑘4 = 0.2，𝜃 =
0.5,   𝑅 − 𝐶 = 2(𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑/ 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ), 𝑄 = 4(𝑇𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑). The penalty coefficient takes the 
mean value θ = 0.5. Then substitutes it into the formula (12). Analysis of the simulation shown in Figure 
5. 
 
Figure 5. Relationship between 
incentive and utility 
As can be seen from Figure 5, as the incentive coefficient increases, the utility of the government will 
increase. Moreover, the utility increases even more when the extra costs imposed by the government are 
greater, indicating that the long-term benefits brought by incentive mechanism far outweigh the costs. 
Under the condition of 𝑀 = 6, when the incentive coefficient 𝛽 = 0.89, the utility of this stage reaches 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺22 = 2.6998,and at the same time the government benefit is 𝐻22 = 15.875. 
 Analysis of the third phase simulation results 
At this stage, the government begins to regulate the P2P non-compliance platform, set the government 
regulation coefficient 𝑃 as the independent variable, the utility coefficient 𝐺33 of the government as the 
dependent variable. In addition, the government weights 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 of dual objective are regarded as 
adjusting variables and divided into three groups. And the values of the three groups are 𝛼1 = 0.2, 𝛼2 =
0.8; 𝛼1 = 0.5, 𝛼2 = 0.5; 𝛼1 = 0.8, 𝛼2 = 0.2. According to the above analysis and setting, 𝑘1 = 0.2,
𝑅 − 𝐶 = 2(𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑/ 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ), 𝑄 = 4(𝑇𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑), 𝜆 = 3, 𝜃 = 0.5, then we substitute these 
values into formula (16), simulation results are shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Relationship between 
regulatory and utility 
It is easy to conclude from Figure 6 that with the increase of government supervision, the utility 𝐺33 
first increases and then decreases. Under the condition that the government pays more attention to the 
economic benefit, that is α1 = 0.2, α2 = 0.8, and when P=0.92, there is an optimal government utility 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺23 = 1.1479, moreover, government revenue is 𝐻23 = 14.1785. 
 Analysis of the fourth phase simulation results 
After the government implements the strategy of “First motivate and then regulate”, the incentive 
mechanism and supervisory measures coexist in P2P industry. The specific analysis is similar to the 
fourth phase of project A. Set the incentive coefficient 𝛽 and regulatory power 𝑃 as the independent 
variables and the utility 𝐺24 as the dependent variable. In addition, the government weights 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 
of dual objective are regarded as adjusting variables and divided into three groups. And the values of 
the three groups are 𝛼1 = 0.2, 𝛼2 = 0.8; 𝛼1 = 0.5, 𝛼2 = 0.5; 𝛼1 = 0.8, 𝛼2 = 0.2. According to the 
above analysis and setting, 𝑔 = 5,𝐻23 = 14.1785, 𝑏 = 0.4, 𝑘1 = 0.2, 𝑘3 = 0.4, 𝑘4 = 0.2, 𝑅 − 𝐶 =
2(𝑡𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑/ 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ), 𝑄 = 4(𝑇𝑒𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑), 𝑃∗ = 0.7,  𝜃 = 0.5, 𝑀 = 6, 𝛽∗∗ = 0.89,   𝑃∗∗ =
0.92, then we substitute these values into formula (20), simulation results are shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Relationship among 
incentive, regulatory and utility 
When the government attaches more importance to the economic benefits of P2P industry (（𝛼1 =
0.2，𝛼2 = 0.8), the maximum value of government utility is 𝐺24 = 7.1173, and 𝑃
′′ = 0.75，𝛽′′ = 1. 
When the government attaches equal importance to the security and economic benefits of P2P industry 
（𝛼1 = 0.5，𝛼2 = 0.5）, the maximum value of government utility is 𝐺24 = 12.4526, at this time, 
𝑃′′ = 0.54，𝛽′′ = 0.982. When the government attaches more importance to the economic benefits of 
P2P industry （𝛼1 = 0.8，𝛼2 = 0.2） ,the maximum value of government utility is 𝐺24 =
17.7937,and then  𝑃′′ = 0.49，𝛽′ = 0.985. It can be seen in the P2P industry has experienced the 
government regulatory measures and incentives, the market's security and stability has improved 
significantly, the government's total utility coefficient has also increased. Therefore, during the parallel 
phase of regulatory restraint and incentive mechanism, the government will pay more attention to the 
economic benefits brought by the P2P industry. The maximum utility coefficient is 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺24 = 17.7937, 
meanwhile 𝑃′ = 0.62  and 𝛽′ = 0.978 . Moreover, the government maximum utility 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺24 =
17.7937  in the parallel phase of project B is much larger than the maximal government utility 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺14 = 8.1906 in the parallel phase of project A. 
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 Comprehensive result analysis 
The first stage of both projects is a description of the objective situation, thus the average value of the 
utility is selected, 𝐺11 = 𝐺21 = 0.5405 . In the second stage, the government adopts an incentive 
mechanism or a supervisory strategy, so it can take the initiative to choose the maximum utility for each 
stage, project A: 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺12 = 1.2487, project B: 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺22 = 2.6998. In the third phase, the government 
could also take the initiative to choose the maximum value, the project A: 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺13 = 1.2182, project 
B: 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺23 = 1.1479; In the parallel phase of incentive and regulatory, the government could still take 
the initiative to choose the maximum value, the project A: 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺14 = 8.1906, project B: 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺24 =
17.7937. Therefore, the utility function 𝐺 is established as a function of time t, furthermore, the area 
enclosed by the function curve and the horizontal axis is the cumulative total utility of the government, 
simulation results shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. The cumulative 
utility of government 
As can be seen from Figure 8, the total utility of project B in the four phases is more than the total utility 
of project A, moreover, in the stage of coexistence of incentive and regulation, 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺24 = 17.7937 >
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐺14 = 8.1906. Therefore, the choice of “First incentive regulation” program strategy is more 
conducive to the government to achieve dual-objective optimization. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Based on the frequent irregularities and imperfect regulatory mechanisms in China’s P2P lending 
industry, this article set specific scenarios and established a game model between the government and 
P2P lending platforms. At the same time, two management schemes were designed, so as to optimize 
the government’s dual-objective of increasing the economic benefits of P2P industry and maintaining 
the security of the industry. The following conclusions can be drawn: First of all, with other conditions 
unchanged, the more the risky platforms account for, the more the economic benefits of the industry, 
but at the same time, the industry and the government may suffer the losses caused by the risky platform 
violations. Therefore, the government must carry out the corresponding governance. Secondly, the 
regulation P is not the bigger the better, because the government has to pay the corresponding regulatory 
costs, thus the regulation should be adjusted continuously with the development of the industry, 
moreover, the extra cost of incentives does not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of the government, 
since incentives provide long-term economic benefits. Thirdly, the project B “First motivate and then 
regulate” is able to achieve the government’s dual-objective optimization and utility maximization. 
Finally, after the P2P industry has experienced the government’s incentive mechanism and supervision 
measures successively, the safety and stability of the entire industry have been significantly improved 
and the total utility coefficient of the government has also risen significantly. Thus, in the parallel stage 
of regulatory and incentive mechanism, paying more attention to the economic benefits brought by the 
P2P industry could make the government obtain greater utility. 
In summary, this paper suggests that in the process of monitoring and managing the P2P industry, the 
government should first encourage the professional P2P platforms by adopting tax incentives, financial 
support, priority projects and other supporting policies to ensure the competitive advantages of the 
formal platform and enhance the security of P2P industry. When the professional platforms occupy more 
in the industry, most of the platforms are able to operate in a compliant manner, then, in the next stage, 
strict regulatory constraints are imposed to punish the non-compliant platforms. This will not only 
reduce the government’s regulatory costs, but also effectively prevent the losses caused by the illegal 
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innovation. In the parallel phase of incentive mechanism and supervision, since the safety and stability 
of the industry have been upgraded, the intensity of supervision can be appropriately reduced. At this 
time, the government should pay more attention to the economic benefits of the industry rather than the 
safety. In addition, the input of incentive mechanism and regulation should be constantly adjusted with 
the development of P2P industry. 
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